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APPIN COLLIERY EXPLOSION REASSESSED 
Bob Kininmonth1 
ABSTRACT: The Judicial Inquiry into the Appin Colliery explosion on 23rd July 1979 made a specific 
finding that the fan starter box was the location of the initial ignition of gas. The subsequent Coronial 
Inquiry recognized the possibility of the fan starter box being the source but also recognized the 
possibility that the Deputy’s flame safety lamp could have been the trigger. Neither Inquiry detailed the 
mistakes that must have been made for either of those options to be the cause.  It is contended that the 
flow of factual information at such Inquiries can be influenced by the high-profile legal representation 
used by the interested parties. It is important to ask whether an Inquiry before an independent technical 
expert would give the industry a better explanation of the factors that led to and caused the event.  
INTRODUCTION 
At 11pm on Tuesday 24th July 1979 an explosion of methane gas in K Panel of Appin Colliery resulted 
in the deaths of 14 workers. This disaster was associated with a changeover of ventilation that was 
intended to create a situation whereby a central intake, in a three heading development panel, would be 
shielded from intake gas by returns on each side. Prior to the changeover the panel had two intakes 
and one return. The then Minister for Mineral Resources directed that a Judicial Inquiry be held. His 
Honour Judge A.J. Goran conducted the Inquiry and delivered his report on 9th May 1980 (Goran, 
1980). Subsequently a coronial Inquiry under the Coroners Act was held before Stipendiary Magistrate 
J. Hiatt and a report delivered on 19th December 1980 (Hiatt, 1980). 
PLANNED VENTILATION CHANGEOVER 
Ventilation conditions in K Panel prior to the changeover and the intended affect of the changeover are 
shown in three stages in Figure 1 as follows: 
 
Stage 1 shows the panel layout on the morning of Tuesday 24th July with A and B headings as 
intakes and LW8 Maingate as the return. The overcast at the intersection of C/T 3 and A heading 
was being built. The LW8 Maingate stub was brattice ventilated. An auxiliary fan in C/T 4 
provided ventilation for A heading while B heading that had been advanced 70 m as an intake 
stub, was ventilated on brattice 
 
Stage 2 shows the post-changeover ventilation flow. This situation was planned to be reached, 
after completion of the overcast, by erection of the temporary brattice in B heading and removal 
of the brattice stopping in C/T 3. 
 
Stage 3 was to be the completion of the changeover with a fan, that had been placed in B heading 
being used to ventilate the stub. 
 
Near the end of the afternoon shift the overcast had been completed and the brattice in B heading had 
been erected. The Deputy who was meant to remove the C/T 3 brattice did not do so because he 
noticed leakage from the overcast.  It was near the end of his shift and he left the panel. During the 
inquiries it could not be established what messages were passed to the evening shift Deputy, but it is 
clear that for some undetermined time the whole of B heading inbye of C/T 3 was virtually unventilated. 
 
                                            
1 Retired Senior Inspector of Coal Mines 
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Figure 1 - Changeover plan 
INQUIRY FINDINGS 
The report by Judge Goran (1980) included the following statements: 
 
1. ‘It is now obvious that I cannot accept as any form of probability the proposition that the deputy’s 
safety lamp caused the first ignition.’ 
2. ‘I am therefore left, as a result of the whole of the evidence, with the conviction that the explosion 
began by an ignition in the fan starter-box. I do not suspect that the deputy’s lamp contributed in 
any way to the explosion.’ 
3. ‘My finding necessitates a finding of gas in the starter-box and around the back of the fan. I am 
unable on the evidence to say in any precise manner how this collected, there being no eye 
witnesses and the evidence itself having been largely destroyed by the explosion. The following 
means are, however open on the evidence: 
i. The failure of adequate ventilation of B stub, because of the non- removal of the No3 cut 
through brattice.  
ii. A possible failure of ventilation due to an occurrence such as a fall in a stopping outbye. 
iii. The substantial leakage in the overcast and through B heading stopping creating a 
serious deficiency of air available to the B heading fan. 
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iv. The failure, deliberate or accidental, of the B heading stopping’. 
 
Coroner Hiatt (1980) stated: 
 
‘I have spent considerable time on my deliberations concerning the question of the source of 
ignition and referred to many aspects both in support and against each of the alternatives 
advanced. Other alternatives were excluded on consideration of the evidence and another raised 
by Mr. Lloyd as to a spark caused by friction on the use of the steel wedge has been left up in the 
air, however I have determined that such a proposition is less likely as a probability than the fan 
starter switch in B heading or the Oil Flame Safety Lamp in the possession of Mr. Rawlcliffe. If it 
was the former then it is probable that some person now deceased was at fault. If it was the latter, 
such act or omission not being deliberate or without exercise of reasonable care, the cause of the 
ignition could have been without fault or accidental.  
 
An examination of the evidence in respect of those two alternatives discloses:  
 
In one, the fan starter switch chamber, a higher probability of an ignition source and less probability 
of gas being present in explosive proportions with a readily ascertainable flame path to the face of 
the headings and in the other, the Deputy’s defective Oil Flame Safety Lamp, there is a higher 
probability of gas in explosive proportion being present with a readily exposed flame path (the vent 
tube or layering) with a less probable source of ignition than that available in the case of an alive 
electrical source in my view neither can be responsibly excluded on the evidence before this Court. 
 
The evidence adduced does not enable me to say what was the source of the ignition which 
caused the explosion of methane gas at the face of the heading.Therefore I am not able to 
determine what the proximate or direct cause was of the explosion but I have concluded that there 
was a condition existing for a period of time whereby the B heading stub was not properly 
ventilated. The precise reason for that has not been disclosed on the evidence but on the balance 
of probability there is evidence that the acts and omissions of persons on the previous shift 
contributed to inadequate ventilation.’ 
ESTABLISHED INFORMATION 
At the time of the explosion ten of the crew members were in the cribroom in the intake roadway and 
four employees were in the face area. The Undermanager, the Deputy and the electrician were near 
the fan. 
 
The following significant matters relevant to the incident appear to have been accepted: 
 
1. The starter box of the fan was not in a flameproof condition, most of the studs had been 
removed. It was considered that the fan had been started and found to be running in reverse. 
Change of direction could be achieved from inside the starter box but should not have been 
attempted with the power on.  
2. At the time of the explosion the fan cable was live. 
3. There was a distinctive pattern mark inside the fan starter, which later tests indicated could only 
have been formed by an internal ignition. 
4. The Deputy was equipped with a flame safety lamp for gas detection. The Undermanager, who 
arrived in the panel at a late stage, had both a flame safety lamp and a methanometer. The 
Deputy’s flame safety lamp, which was damaged in the explosion, was shown by later 
examination to have some defects. In particular it was found that the relighter key was missing.  
5. There was a brattice stopping in C/T 3, which should have been removed to allow flow of air into 
the return, it was not removed as expected and the time of its removal could not be determined. 
6. The roadway in which the fan had been installed was almost completely unventilated for an 
undetermined period but possibly as long as five hours. 
7. Scientific investigation indicated that the explosion was initiated at the face end of the standing 
stub entry. It was considered that flame had traveled up the vent tubes leading to the gas 
accumulation at the face.  
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8. The inspectorate did not enforce the requirement of General Rule 1 of the Coal Mines Regulation 





In assessing the circumstances that led to the explosion there are a number of matters that are 




There were three levels of methane covered by legislation in New South Wales: a level of 0.25 per cent 
in the intake, a level of 1.25 per cent when electric power would be disconnected and a level of 2.5 per 
cent when workers would be withdrawn. 
 
In addition it is important to acknowledge that methane in air will burn on a flame and can be 
recognized between 1.25 percent and 4.5 per cent. At 5 per cent an ignition occurs. When present at 
higher percentages methane is most easily ignited at 7.5 percent and has its maximum explosive 




A flameproof enclosure is designed so that the lid of the enclosure fits on a wide edge that absorbs 
heat and prevents an internal explosion being transmitted with sufficient energy to ignite an external 
explosive mixture. It is essential that the lid is tightly held in place –usually by a number of screwed 
studs. If a flameproof enclosure is to be opened where gas may occur it is important to disconnect the 
power supply 
 
After the explosion at Appin the fan starter-box was found to be in a non-flameproof condition with only 
one of the 24 studs in place. The starter-box immediately became suspect as the source of the ignition. 
 
Flame safety lamps 
 
Apart from the ability to show the presence of methane, safety lamps have also been regarded as being 
an important tool in providing warning by being extinguished in low levels of oxygen. They have the 
characteristic that when they are placed in contact with methane at 5 per cent an ignition inside the 
lamp extinguishes the flame and the flame does not pass outside because of the protective gauze 
construction. 
 
A post-explosion investigation showed that many safety lamps at Appin and in the Illawarra, had minor 
defects. A series of tests of safety lamps with these defects indicated that in some circumstances they 
could transmit an ignition to an outside explosive mixture. MacKenzie-Wood (1980) reported: 
 
‘Glasses with ‘non-parallel’ ends, found in colliery stock fitted to a safety lamp in otherwise good 
condition, were found to ignite an external flammable atmosphere with internal ignition’ 
 
The safety lamps issued to Deputies and other officials at Appin were of the Protector type with a 
pyrophor relighting facility. The approval for that type of safety lamp contained a condition that a lamp 
should not be relit in a place where gas was likely to be present. 
 
Judge Goran (Goran, 1966) in his report on the Bulli Colliery fire commented. 
 
1. ‘The oil flame safety lamp has a long and successful history in mines as an instrument of safety. 
Its flame can readily detect carbon dioxide or methane. Despite any criticisms which have been 
levelled at it during my Inquiry and elsewhere it is truly the miners friend and, in my opinion 
cannot at present be supplanted.’ 
 
2. ‘There has been demonstrated before me an improved oil flame safety lamp manufactured in 
Great Britain which has a relighting device within it, whereby the lamp can be relit by use of a 
lever which generates by friction a spark in the safety of the lamp itself, without the lamp being 
unlocked for this purpose it should not be relit except in the main body of the air current. This is 
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because there may be an explosive mixture within the lamp itself. A repeated explosion would 
render the lamp ineffective, since its gauzes would become red hot.’  
 
Strang and Mackenzie-Wood (1990) wrote: 
‘If a lamp is defective then it is during the act of relighting that the moment of greatest potential 
danger lies.’ 
 
It is of interest to note that safety lamps have always been suspect in conditions of high air velocity and 
that the relighting of lamps can be a source of danger. 
 
Pamely (1898) wrote in the following terms: 
 ‘Again if the lamp were extinguished in any other way, and subsequently filled with an explosive 
mixture, the sudden flash of re-lighting and the internal explosion might cause sufficient pressure 




’The most severe test that can be made on a lamp in a still atmosphere is the ‘internal ignition test’ 
and while it should be made on all types of lamp, it is particularly appropriate to lamps fitted with 
internal relighters for it is during the act of relighting that the moment of potential danger lies if the 
lamp is defective.’      
 
Strang and Mackenzie-Wood (1990) continued: 
‘The pyrophor relighter lamps were banned in Germany, their country of origin, in 1953.'  
 
Following the explosion at Moura No4 Mine in 1986 an Inquiry (Queensland Government, 1986) 
concluded that safety lamps were not considered to be safe in atmospheres containing methane and 
coal dust and they were withdrawn from general use in Queensland coal mines. 
 
Although approval for the use of safety lamps was not revoked in New South Wales they were 
gradually removed from service and it appears there are now none in use. 
 
Removal of accumulations 
 
The use of a fan to remove an accumulation of gas from a roadway is not an unusual event. The 
essential features of such use are: 
 
1. The area around the fan should not contain more than 1.25 per cent of methane. 
2. The exhaust gas passing through the fan should contain less than 2.5 per cent methane. 
 
It would be the duty of the deputy to ensure the area was free of gas and to arrange for the vent tubes 
to be separated at a convenient point so that enough fresh air entered the tubes to ensure the exhaust 
was kept below 2.5 per cent. The vent tubes inbye of the separation point carry high levels of methane 
and these are diluted by fresh air feeding in. When the fan stops the methane-rich flow will not stop 
immediately. 
  
The Appin circumstances 
 
The changeover from two intakes to one intake and two returns was an unusual procedure for Appin. It 
was not possible to establish whether each of the on-site officials was kept in touch with progress in the 
changeover period. It is clear however that the final stages of the changeover had been reached by the 
start of the evening shift on the day of the explosion. 
 
On the previous shift the overcast in 3 cutthrough was completed and a temporary brattice stopping 
was erected in B heading outbye of C/T 3. It was planned that the brattice stopping in C/T 3 would be 
removed so that B heading would become a return. The deputy who was on-site did not remove the 
C/T 3 brattice because he became aware that there was leakage of intake air through the overcast. It 
was not possible to establish when or if the C/T 3 brattice was removed. It is obvious however, that until 
it was taken down B heading was almost completely unventilated.  
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The brattice for the stopping in B heading was found after the explosion to have been erected on the 
wrong side of the props. Assuming this did not affect its efficiency and that the leakage from the 
overcast was not as significant as suggested, removal of the C/T 3 stopping was all that was necessary 
to establish B heading as an operational return. 
 
Once this was done the final step to be undertaken was the establishment of fan ventilation for the 
standing stub of B heading inbye of C/T 4. 
 
The Deputy’s role 
 
Apart from his responsibility to ensure safety in his panel the Deputy should have carried out the 
following actions before starting the fan: 
 
1. Test for gas in the area around the fan. 
2. Assess that there was an adequate flow of air down the newly opened return. 
3. Arranged for the vent tubes to be separated so that when the fan was started the exhaust from 
the fan would contain less than 2.5 per cent methane. 
 
Operation of the fan 
 
It was accepted that the fan was started and was found to be running in reverse. In reverse the fan 
could still pass air in the correct direction but at a much lower volume (approximately 40 per cent of its 
rated capacity).  Correction of reverse running can be achieved by disconnecting the power, opening 
the starter box and making suitable adjustments. It is, of course, important to reclose the starter box 




After extensive testing at Londonderry and elsewhere it was agreed that the blast pattern in the starter 
box could only have been formed by an internal ignition. Even though the cover was only held in place 
by one stud the explosion in B stub could not have caused the pattern in the box.  
 
It was accepted that the trigger for the explosion was an ignition of methane that travelled inside the 
vent tubes. If the starter box provided the spark for the ignition then, apart from the fact that power was 
left on to the fan, the following events must have occurred: 
 
1. The flow of air in B heading was insufficient to prevent recirculation (possibly even when the 
fan was running in reverse and passing a low flow volume). 
2. The recirculation was undetected. 
3. An explosive mixture was allowed to pass through the fan perhaps because the vent tubes had 
not been separated.  
4. The cloud of recirculated air remained stationery around the fan and the starter box during the 
time taken to open the starter box. 
5. Both the Deputy and the Undermanager, who were equipped with safety lamps, must have 
failed to notice or failed to act on the fact that their safety lamps were extinguished by the 
presence of the explosive mixture. 
6. The starter button must have been pressed while the fan was not in a flameproof condition. 
 
There is, however, one alternative possibility that is supported by the fact that B heading was left 
virtually unventilated for an extended interval. During the period before the C/T 3 brattice was removed 
gas continued to accumulate. The build-up may well have extended into the zone between C/T 3 and 
C/T 4 and also into the starter box. Under that condition the first application of power, that is when the 
fan was run in reverse, would have led to ignition in the box and could have led to formation of the blast 
pattern at a time when the box was in a flameproof condition. 
 
After the explosion the body of the Deputy was found in the shuttle car. There is no logical reason for 
him to be there unless he was either on the boom of the miner or in the shuttle car controlling the gap in 
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the vent tubes and ensuring that the fan exhaust was carrying a low percentage of methane. It is 
possible that he did not realise he was in a spill of methane from the separated vent tubes and caused 
the ignition by attempting to relight his lamp.  Withdrawal of the key can cause a spark sufficient to 
ignite methane in the lamp. This proposition is reinforced by the fact that the Deputy’s lamp was found 
without the relighter key. It is difficult to imagine how the force of an explosion could remove the key 




For a number of years prior to 1979 the problem of maintaining intake gas levels at less than 0.25 per 
cent had been discussed with the management of the colliery. Intake quantities had been increased 
without solving the problem. Trials with methane drainage holes had been carried out but were not at 
that time considered to be successful in controlling the make of gas. 
 
The preamble to the General Rules of the Coal Mines Regulation Act (NSW Government, 1978) 
contained the statement that those rules shall be observed as far as is reasonably practicable. It was in 
the spirit of that statement and in recognition of ongoing efforts to control gas-make that mining 
continued.   Although an increase in intake gas levels was bound to make face ventilation more difficult 
there was never any attempt to accept higher than prescribed levels at the face or elsewhere.   
 
When it became obvious, during the Judicial Inquiry, that inspectors had allowed levels higher than 
0.25 per cent in the intakes some concern was expressed and Judge Goran referred to the matter as 
“inspectorial tolerance”. 
 
Goran (1980) recorded two relevant and somewhat contradictory statements about that matter: 
 
1. At page 87 ‘I hasten to say that the Minister and the Undersecretary were quick through Counsel 
to deny knowledge of the practice and to disassociate themselves from it’ 
 
2. At page 91 in reference to an exemption granted before the explosion ‘…the Minister saying that 
the quantities of methane being liberated in the colliery were giving him cause for considerable 
concern’ 
 
A letter to the manager requesting details, of action he proposed to take to control the intake gas 
situation was included in a Departmental file. That file which also contained follow-up reports by 
inspectors was available to Counsel but was not presented to the inquiry. When asked about this, 
Counsel assisting the Inquiry indicated that though he was representing the Minister he was not 
representing Departmental officers. That fact, together with a further comment at page 87 by Goran 
(1980), puts into question the objectivity of the Department. The comment, by Goran, was: 
 
‘I have received a document from Inspectors in the Department who are not coal mining Inspectors and 
are appointed under different legislation They wish me to make it clear that they should in no way be 
confused with those Inspectors whose duty it is to enforce the Coal Mines Regulation Act.’ 
 
When notice of the Coronial Inquiry was received a letter signed by six Inspectors requested approval 
for one of their number to be their representative.  
 
Approval was granted by the Coroner. 
INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In a press release, the Minister for Mineral Resources, (Mulock, 1980), identified 27 recommendations 
from the Judicial Inquiry. Kininmonth (1981) listed 14 of the ones that may have had an immediate or 
major effect. It is appropriate at this time to consider an abbreviated version of all 27 with the Minister’s 
comments and an indication of the current position: 
 
 Official circulation of specific material on limitation of explosions. 
 
Minister’s comment: Instructions given for booklets and films to be prepared and distributed. 
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Current position: A document Guideline for coal dust explosion prevention and suppression 
was prepared (NSW Department of Primary Industries, 2001). 
 
 Reference should be made to overseas work in determining the adequacy of legislation dealing 
with fires and explosions. 
 
 Minister’s comment: Stonedusting and control of flammable gas will be given specific 
attention in the current review of the Coal Mines Regulation Act. 
 
 Current position: This matter is covered in the Coal Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2006 ( 
NSW Government, 2006). 
 
 All collieries should review whether their precautions against propagation of an explosion are 
sufficient. 
 
Minister’s comment: Chief Inspector to commence an examination.  If necessary, action will 
be taken to require management of mines to revise their precautions 
. 
Current position: This is covered by Hazard Management Plans in Regulations 35 and 36 of 
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2006 (NSW Government, 2006) 
 
 Legislation should be strong in areas of known danger to attempt to prevent any foreseeable 
risk of an incendive nature. 
 
Minister’s comment: The need for legislation to prevent any foreseeable risk of an incendive 
nature is indisputable.  
 
Current position: A booklet titled “Preventing Frictional Ignitions” was made available to the 
industry.  
 
 The gas problem will become apparent to most deep-mining projects.  
The Department should act to inspect and advise collieries on new techniques. 
 
Minister’s comment: The department is considering the need to employ a “gas control 
engineer” 
 
Current position: The Department does not have such a staff employee. 
 
 General Rule 4 reports are vague in the extreme and give no real information as to actual gas 
conditions or ventilation. 
 
Minister’s comment: Action has been taken on the revision suggested. 
 
Current position: There is now no standard form. 
 
 There should be some check upon the Deputy’s safety inspections. The ideal officer to perform 
this task is the Federation’s Check Inspector. 
 
Minister’s comment: This issue will require detailed consideration. The parties concerned will 
examine ways in which the recommendation may be given effect. 
 
Current position: Although there is no specific supervisory role in regard to deputies, the Coal 
Mines Regulation Act 1982 (NSW Government 1982) made provision for District Check 
Inspectors to suspend operations if they became aware of a condition of danger or a breach of 
regulations. 
 
 The Deputy must be given a methanometer as well as his safety lamp. 
 
Minister’s comment: I agree. Specific training programmes for the Deputies on the proper use 
of methanometers will be introduced. 
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Current position: Since the withdrawal of flame safety lamps all deputies are issued with multi-
gas detectors. 
 
 I would recommend the appointment of a ventilation officer perhaps with a part-time but prime 
responsibility whose duty it would be to supervise the whole question of ventilation in a mine. 
 
Minister’s comment: Action is being taken to determine the legal mechanism to define the 
duties of such an officer. 
 
Current position: All mines are required to have a Ventilation Officer and to have a biannual 
audit from a Ventilation Engineer 
 
 The system of policing an Act designed to keep mines safe must be kept as tight as possible. 
 
Minister’s comment: The act dealing with health and safety must be observed. It is 
unfortunate that it must be policed. 
 
Current position: The Act and Regulations are enforced by Departmental Inspectors. 
 
 All experiments (related to an Inquiry) should be departmentally official, permitted and 
conducted under the supervision of one director. 
 
Minister’s comment: Any such appointment will be made by me. 
 
Current position: The Department now has an Investigation Unit and there is provision in 
section 147 of the Coal Mines Health and Safety Act 2002 for the appointment of investigators 
(NSW Government, 2002). 
 
 The dearth of competent Inspectors. Inspections sometimes are separated by months and then 
do not involve the whole mine. 
 
Minister’s comment: I believe that there will continue to be difficulties in recruiting competent 
Inspectors because of the competing demands of an expanding coal mining industry. 
 
Current position:  It is apparently still difficult to recruit and retain Inspectors. Their functions 
are supplemented by the appointment of Mine safety Officers who have limited powers but do 
carry out audit and inspection duties. 
 
 There appears to be a totally inadequate number of Electrical Inspectors. 
 
Minister’s comment:  Immediate action be taken in relation to this particular staffing matter. 
 
Current position: Present staff levels appear to be satisfactory. 
 
 No record of the result of an inspection (by a local Inspector) seems to be left at a mine. 
 
Minister’s comment: The fact that no record of the results of inspections is left at the mine is 
an obvious deficiency in the current system and I have arranged for this matter to be corrected 
immediately. 
 
Current position: Although reports of inspection are not made as a routine procedure any 
matter of concern is covered by a notice in writing. 
 
 A duplicate copy of exemptions should be sent to the local check inspector. 
 
Minister’s comment: I agree that the check inspector should be supplied with a  
copy of exemptions which may be granted in respect of the mine at which he is employed. 
 
Current position: This is now done. 
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 I feel that it is dangerous to raise the present statutory limit of  .25%. If there is  any   tolerance, 
it should be limited to a low departure from the statutory provision and only given on written 
application to the Chief Inspector for exemption. 
 
Minister’s comment: It is my intention that the present statutory limit should be maintained. If 
there is a situation where tolerance may be required, it will only be given on written application 
to the Chief Inspector. 
 
Current position: This is now standard procedure. 
 
 I feel that it would be an advantage for collieries to be graded in terms of gassiness. 
 
Minister’s comment: I have asked the Chief Inspector to determine what advantages would 
accrue from adopting the recommendation. I will require urgent action. 
 
Current position: Gas monitoring is used to determine the standard of stonedusting to be 
used.   
 
 I specifically recommend that every lampman be supplied with an illuminated magnifying glass 
for the inspection of faults in gauzes. 
 
Minister’s comment: The Department has commenced action towards preparation of a code 
for the use and maintenance of oil flame safety lamps. 
 
Current position: this was done until the withdrawal of safety lamps.  
 
 In the more gassy mines there needs to be a requirement that an automatic monitoring device 
of a sufficiently portable nature be installed at strategic points to give a continuous reading of 
CH4, CO and O2. 
 
Minister’s comment: The matter of automatic monitoring in gassy mines needs to be 
separated into two areas of concern. One is the matter of general monitoring of the mine 
atmosphere by way of automatic devices. The second is that of provision of an individual air 
sampler which can provide an automatic alarm to the person carrying the device. 
 
Current position: Gas monitoring is widely used and Deputies carry automatic alarming 
instruments. 
 
 It appears that there is a grave danger in driving a lengthy stub in a gassy panel and leaving it 
stand on brattice ventilation alone particularly on the intake side. As a suggestion only I put 
forward the figure of 50 metres as the limit. 
 
Minister’s comment: I have directed the Chief Inspector to investigate as a matter of urgency 
the manner in which the recommendation can be given effect. 
 
Current position: The overall problem has been reduced by improvements in methane 
drainage. There is also some use of supplementary compressed air ventilation at times of 
power failure. 
 
 I have been asked to make a special recommendation that the Regulations make provision for 
not removing any (stone dust or water) barrier once it has been  placed in position. 
 
 Minister’s comment: I have directed that a complete review be made of the present 
requirements in respect of stone dust and water barriers. 
 
Current position: This matter is dealt with in the Guideline for coal dust explosion prevention 
and suppression.( NSW Department of Primary Industries, 2001). 
 
 There is need for proper policing of those parts of the Act and Regulations which deal with the 
opening of flameproof enclosures under voltage. 
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Minister’s comment: I have directed that all regulations dealing with the safety provisions of 
flameproof enclosures under voltage must be placed under continual review. 
 
Current position: This matter was already covered by Reg. 31 of the 7th Schedule of the 1912 
Act (NSW Govt., 1978). It was adopted into the 1982 Act and is now covered by Reg.19 of the 
Coal Mines Health and Safety Regulations, 2006 (NSW Govt., 2006). 
. 
 Regulation by legislation is required for a breaker system to prevent any flameproof enclosure 
being opened without the automatic disconnection of power. This kind of device and the 
necessary circuitry are already known to the Departmental electrical inspectors and it should be 
an essential requirement.  
 
Minister’s comment: I have no hesitation in agreeing with this recommendation. 
 
Current position: Not all flameproof enclosures have interlocks. 
Electrical equipment is now required to meet IEEE Standards. It appears that those Standards 
do not insist on interlocks. 
 
 Advocates addressing me have expressed dissatisfaction with the qualification of two distinct 
classes of mining people: 
 
i. the man with  a certificate from abroad who receives endorsement of his certificate of 
competency without the necessity to show sufficient local competency; 
ii. the method of recruitment of “new starters” and their induction training. 
 
Minister’s comment: There will be a requirement for all persons registered for practice in New 
South Wales to obtain a qualification in New South Wales mining practices and law. I have 
noted the comments made and particularly those attributed to the Miners’ Federation, that they 
consider the current training requirements to be inadequate. I support this view 
 
Current position: There is now a mutual recognition scheme covering all Australian States and 
New Zealand. Holders of certificates from other areas are required to sit for the full relevant 
examinations. 
  
 I am still concerned, however, about the discomfort self-rescuers cause to those who    are 
forced to use them. 
 
Minister’s comment: I have asked the Chief Inspector, in co-operation with the Director of the 
Chemical Laboratories of my Department to investigate the current status of research and 
development into this type of equipment overseas and whether or not it is possible by local 
innovation, to introduce an improved model. 
 
Current position: Most mines now provide oxygen producing self-rescuers. 
 
 It would be a pity, however, if experimenting remained the sole use of the Department’s 
research and testing centre at Londonderry, even though this ranks highest in the galleries 
importance. It should be used as a teaching aid for men in the industry. 
 
Minister’s comment: For some years the department has run training sessions for officers 
from the coal mines in this state. During these courses  the facilities at the Chemical 
Laboratories and the Londonderry Centre have been used as a training and demonstration aid. 
Their use will continue. 
 
Current position: Londonderry is now not part of the Department. It is used as a central 
meeting point but not for training purposes.  
 
 The Judge referred to separate comments, which he made privately on the draft of the 
legislation designed to replace the existing Coal Mines Regulation Act. 
 
Minister’s comment: A number of these comments have already been referred to my 
Department for consideration. 
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Current position: It is impossible to comment on such private submissions. 
THE ROLE OF INQUIRIES 
Goran (1980) in the report of his Inquiry made the following statements as part of his preliminary 
observations: 
 
1. Most inquiries into fires, explosions and disasters in coal mines which occur in the United 
Kingdom are non-judicial inquiries, the investigation itself being conducted at a senior 
administrative level. The resultant report takes the form of a description of the colliery and the 
relevant equipment, followed by a narrative setting out the events. Conclusions are in short form 
and there is a list of recommendations for future improvements in coal mines generally. 
 
2. I make no criticism of this method of reporting. The report which I now tender, however, is the 
report of a Court which has investigated an explosion. The conclusions drawn are based upon a 
mass of evidence tendered before me and tested in the greatest detail by the cross- examination 
of learned counsel. 
 
3. .I have adopted standards of proof as any Judge must do, accepting some evidence and 
rejecting other evidence at times which experience in judgment has told me I cannot accept. 
 
4. It must always be borne in mind that the duty of this Court is to assist in so regulating the industry 
that events such as that which occurred at Appin Colliery are not repeated and that men who 
work in this industry should do so with such safety as can be afforded to them  by legislation or 
by proper practices.  
 
There is no doubt that many of the recommendations of the Appin Inquiry have led to significant 
changes in the NSW coal industry. Since 1965 there have been four Judicial Inquiries in NSW; Bulli, 
West Wallsend, Appin and Gretley. Looking at these from an industry perspective, there are valid 
questions that may be asked about the economic cost of such inquiries and whether legal 
representation is given on the basis of a search for the facts or in an attempt to protect clients. 
 
Carver (1981) speaking from his experience as a retired Chief Inspector in Great Britain said: 
 
 ‘Some twenty years ago the representatives of the Unions, Management, and Inspectorate 
decided they would not employ lawyers in future Inquiries and that each interested party would 
appoint someone from within its own ranks to present its case and cross-examine witnesses. The 
reason for this interesting decision was to keep the Inquiry on a purely technical basis without the 
introduction of legal niceties and even ‘red herrings.’ 
 
Hargraves (1996) in a letter to the Bulletin of The AusIMM, included the following comments: 
 
1. ‘As expected with their background of generally adversarial work, the thread of the Moura No2 
Explosion Inquiry conducted essentially by members of the legal  profession had elements of 
laying blame and appearing to attempt to have some witnesses contradict themselves.’ 
 
2. ‘Inquiry barristers have been known to withhold evidence ‘ because it will not help our case’. So 
much for the threefold aim of, how, why and non-repetition. There are some in the Industry who 
consider that the careers of others have been unfairly hurt entirely due to partial ignorance 
behind some attitudes and decisions of legal participants.’ 
 
3. ‘Perhaps it is time to consider more seriously a purely technical inquiry on the UK pattern,.  
 
It should be noted that whereas the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1912 as amended (NSW Government, 
1978) made provision for Judicial Inquiries the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 (NSW 
Government, 2002) in section 113 makes provision for a person  (obviously, including a Judge) to be 
appointed as a Board of Inquiry.  Despite the fact that, under section 114 (9), evidence given by a 
witness is not admissible in any criminal proceedings, there is still the following provision of section 113 
(5): 
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 ’If the Board of Inquiry agrees, an agent (including a legal practitioner) may represent a person or 
body at the inquiry’. 
 
It is not clear how involved that representation could be.  
CONCLUSIONS 
A disaster, such as that at Appin, has a devastating effect on the mine and the mining community. It 
can only be small compensation for those affected to be given an understanding of how the event 
occurred but it is important to give assurance that the cause is understood and that action will be taken 
to prevent a recurrence. 
 
The current legislation provides for use of Boards of Inquiry  but does not remove the possible 
involvement of legal representation. The fact that many recommendations from past Inquiries have led 
to improvements in mine safety does not alter the feeling of many in the industry that legal 
representation sometimes prevents the achievement of believable conclusions about the cause of 
disasters. It may be time to look, in retrospect, at the Appin disaster and to ask if a technical 
investigation would have given a clearer understanding of the event and led to better procedures being 
adopted. 
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